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HATE CRIMES: CRIMES OF MOrfiVE,
CHARACTER, OR GROUP TERROR?
PAUL H. ROBINSON

ABSTRACT
The primary objection of traditional criminal law theory to
hate crimes is use of the actor's "motive" in defining the offense
or the penalty enhancement. Motive, it is said, ought not be, and
generally is not held to be, relevant to criminal liability. Hate
crimes violate this rule by taking account of the actor's motivehis or her anti-race, anti-religion, anti-sexual-preference, or other
anti-group motive.
I will argue that motive ought to be and commonly is,
notwithstanding the claims to the contrary, an element in determining liability or grade of offense. What is objectionable, and
what generally has been prohibited, is use of an actor's character
or general set of values as an element of liability or grading; but
motive is not character. By keeping the law's focus only upon the
character attributes relevant to the conduct constituting the offense, motive in fact serves a useful role in reducing the temptation of liability inquiries to stray towards punishing general
character.
VVhile reliance upon motive may be consistent with traditional criminal law theory, it does not follow that motive is necessarily the best criterion for defining the harms and evils that hate
crimes seek to punish. Using an actor's bigoted motivation as a
defining characteristic creates special difficulties in implementation and application, as well as dangers of infringing constitutionally protected speech or expressive conduct. One might conclude
that, while traditional notions of criminal law theory would permit
its use, hate motivation is best avoided as an offense or grading
element, in favor of more objective factors present in such offenses. A promising alternative is the criminalization of conduct
that is intended to cause (or risk) intimidation or terror of an
identifia ble group. That alternative avoids the possibility of First
Amendment problems and is consistent with mainstream criminai
law theory by punishing an actor according to the extent of the
harm caused, ris ked, or intended.
Paul H. Robinson is Professor of Law, Northwestern University
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INTRODUCTION
In an effort to condemn and deter crimes motivated by hatred and bigotry, many states have enacted new crimes or sentencing enhancements that punish such crimes. Hate motivation
for committing the crime may not always be an explicit element;
the most common formulation, following the Anti-Defamation
League ("ADL") model statute, punishes selection of a victim "by
reason of the actual or perceived race, color, religion, national
origin, or sexual orientation" of the victim. 1
Even in this form, however, the offense punishes or enhances
punishment for the actor's motivation in selecting the victim-"by
reason of. ... " Both formulations raise the question of whether
reliance upon an actor's motivation is appropriate in the definition of a criminal offense.
I

MOTIVATION AS AN ELEMENT OF LIABILITY
OR GRADING
A common claim is that motive is not, and ought not be, relevant to criminal liability or grading. 2 T he law cares about intention, not motive. But that does not seem consistent with existing
criminal law. "Motive" has this dictionary definition: "something
(as a need or desire) that causes a person to act." 3 T here is no
reason to think that treatise writers or criminal code drafters
would give it a different meaning. Yet criminal law is full of offenses that have as elements a particular reason for acting, a need
or desire that causes the person to act. Publicly exposing one's
genitals with the purpose of gratifying one's sexual desire is indecent exposure; breaking into a house with the purpose of committing a crime
therein is burglary; killing another for payment frequently is an aggravated form of murder. 4 Indeed, every time an offense definition contains the phrase "with the purpose to ... , " the law takes
1. ADL Legal Affairs Departme nt, ADL Law Report: Hate Crimes Statutes:
A Response to Anti-Semitism, Vandalism, and Violent Bigotry 1 (1988 & Supp.
1990).
2. See, e .g., George Fletcher, Rethinking Criminal Law 463 (1978); Jerome
Hall, General Principles of Crimin al Law 98-99 (2d ed. 194 7).
3. Webster's Seventh New Co ll egia te Dictionary 553 (1965). Specialized
literatures mi ght give it a special mea nin g, of course.
4. Most jurisdi ctions treat thi s no t as an offense element , but as a factor
relevant to grading, as in the Model Penal Co de 's use of " fo r pecun iary gain" as
an aggravating factor in considering imposition of the d eath penalty. lvl odel Penal Code§ 210.6(3)(g) (1985).
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as an offense element the actor's motive, the cause of his or her
act.
It is the nature of human conduct that nearly every action is
performed for a purpose. In nearly every instance there is
"something that causes a person to act": to steal the television in
the house broken into, to gain sexual gratification by "flashing"
another, or to earn the money offered for the killing. And these
causes of action-these purposes, motives-often are relevant to
determining how blameworthy an actor is for the action. I will
leave it to the philosophers to develop a theory as to which motives ought to be relevant to criminal liability and which ought
not, but I can give some examples. It commonly would be judged
less blameworthy to break into a house for a place to sleep than to
steal the television; less blameworthy to "flash" another in order
to change one's clothes conveniently than to gain sexual satisfaction; and less blameworthy to kill out of jealousy than for a fee.
Some motives can reduce an actor's blameworthiness. If an
actor breaks into a mountain cabin to steal food to save his family
from starving until rescuers find them, the reason for acting undercuts the actor's blameworthiness. Good motive frequently will
give rise either to a justification defense or to an excuse defense
for a mistake as to justification.
Not all motives are relevant to liability. Every intentional killing may have a motivational cause, and most are to be condemned. But some motives may not significantly increase or
decrease an actor's blameworthiness from that for the typical intentional killing. Killing out of jealousy, revenge, or anger might
all be equally condemnable, but none are likely to be as condemnable as killing for a fee.
An actor's motive, such as wanting to steal the television, may
tell us that the actor desires to cause harm beyond that already
caused, adding a ground for added inchoate liability. The motivation may make the act itself seem particularly more offensive to
us, as in killing for a fee, perhaps because it reveals the act to be
more calculated than we might otherwise have thought.
The actor's motive also may tell us something about the actor's general character. T he motive to steal may suggest greed;
the ki lling for a fee may suggest an extreme indifference to the
val ue of human life. It is not that the law punishes an actor for his
o r her greed or indifference but, whe n such aspects of character
are exercised in performance of the offense conduct, they may alter
our assessment of the blameworthiness of the actor for that
conduct.
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To summarize, motive-the cause of an action-frequently is
an element of liability and grading, and no apparent reason exists
why it should not be that way. It should alter liability if and only if
it alters an actor's blameworthiness for the prohibited act. Some
motives alter our judgments of blameworthiness, others do not;
distinguishing between the two is the challenge put to criminal
code drafters.
Some people might argue that use of motive is unobjectionable if the motive is to cause an external result. This kind of motive might even be called an intention. The purpose or motive (or
intention) of the actor's conduct is to bring about an external
consequence: to obtain the television or to obtain the fee for the
killing. More problematic, they might argue, is motive that satisfies an internal emotion. 5 I kill my neighbor not because it will
bring about a desirable external consequence-for instance, he
will stop attracting my spouse's attention-but because it will
bring some purely internal satisfaction: revenge for the role he
played in causing my spouse to leave me long ago. Should the
criminal law be more suspicious of using such internal-satisfaction
motives than external-consequence motives?
This is a question of some importance in the matter of hate
crimes because some actors may commit such offenses not for the
harm that they cause to the hated group-e.g., intimidating
others who identify with the victim-but rather for the internal
satisfaction that it brings, the satisfaction of their hatred.
However, the distinction between internal and external goals
seems tenuous. When the flasher exposes himself, his motive is,
as the offense details, to satisfy his sexual desire-an internal satisfaction, not an external consequence . His motive is key to defining the offense, for it excludes from liability the person who
"flashes" another not to gain sexual satisfaction but simply because they are late to a meeting that requires a change of clothes.
There seems little reason to claim that because the motive is an
internal one, sexual satisfaction, it is an inappropriate element of
liability. One may wish to dispute whether one internal motive or
another increases (or decreases) an actor's blame\vorthiness;
some will while others will not. It would be odd, though, to insist
that the criminal law can never take account of an internal motive .
Even where the immediate motive is to cause an external
consequence , the desire for that external consequence ma y stem
5. Fo r a discussion of th e di s tin ction, see Glanvill e Williams , C rimin al Law :
Th e Ge neral Part 48 (2d ed . 19 61).
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from the wish to satisfy an internal desire. The killer for a fee may
want the money not to provide worldly comforts (he never spends
it); rather, earning the fee in this way gives him a sense of selfimportance and power. Does it matter to us that his motive is
such internal satisfaction rather than to acquire external comforts? Killing for a fee is particularly repugnant no matter which
motivation, internal or external, is dominant. Indeed, most of the
cause-and-effect chains of motive and action ultimately lead to
satisfaction of an internal desire. The person who breaks into the
cabin to feed his family has their safety as his immediate concern,
but why? Perhaps because it makes him feel good to protect his
loved ones. Should this internal satisfaction disqualify his motive
as worthy of a mitigation or defense?
II

MOTIVE AS A SUBSTITUTE FOR CHARACTER
Rather than leading the criminal law into questionable territory, motive can be a useful device in keeping the criminal law
from expanding into such territory, as in imposing liability because of an actor's character. (By character, I mean an actor's personal predisposition toward certain kinds of conduct or beliefs:
honesty, dishonesty, bigotry, tolerance, generosity, stinginess.
Each says something about a person's internal decision-making
and suggests how the person is predisposed to act in the future.)
One could conceive of a world where greed or indifference to
the value of human life, or other traits of bad character, were
themselves grounds for criminal liability and punishment. These
are traits to be condemned. Bad character shows both a moral
shortcoming in itself and a predisposition toward future antisocial
conduct. Why wait until the bad character expresses itself in a
burglary or killing? vVhy not allow proof of bad character itself to
be adequate to bring to bear the law's power to punish the "offender" and protect the public?
It may be that some of this kind of thinking lies behind the
current popularity of hate crimes . Racial, religious, or sexual bigotry shows bad character that deserves punishment. Such character is a form o f moral depravity in itself and call s for
condemnation by the criminal law. If we can identify the hatemongers in our society, we can punish them and, in the process,
publicly reaffirm society's commitment to the virtues of tolerance.
But this is where traditional criminal law theory ·would have
some difficulty. Vv' e do not criminalize or punish bad character, of
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course; the criminal law is reserved for condemning past antisocial conduct for which the actor is to blame. A person's character
may be an adequate ground for heaven-and-hell judgments by
religion, but the criminal law restricts itself to punishing at most
expressions of character through action.
Sometimes thought of as the act r e quirement, this basic principle has several justifica tions. First, the legal process has a limited ability to know character except through action. A greedy
and indifferent person may successfully hide behind lawful acts
his or her entire life. Second, all except the determinists believe
that a person has the power to choose how he or she will act at
any given moment, no matter what his or her character may be. A
greedy or indifferent person may successfully bring himself to
overcome that predisposition and to lead a lawful life. And, finally, few people have a character that is all good or all bad. Even
the leader of the Ku Klux Klan might contribute his kidney to
save his daughter. How is the law to punish a person who is good
in some respects and bad in others? How could the law hope to
balance a person's good traits against the bad?
By waiting for action, the criminal law hopes that in each of
life's decisions an actor may choose to do something different
than that toward which bad character predisposes. By waiting for
action, the law justifies punishment upon the actor's choice not to
act differently than his or her bad character predisposes. That is,
the criminal law waits to see how, and if, a person's bad character
will be exercised in bad conduct.
The conduct may tell us something about the actor and the
choice that he or she has made. To the extent that the circumstances tell us something relevant to blameworthiness, we ta ke account of that in assessing liability and grade. The motives for
breaking and entering (to steal the television), or for killing (to
earn a fee), or for flashing (to get sexual satisfaction), do tell us
something relevant. By taking account of these motives, the law
takes account of character in the only way that it properly can if it
is to maintain its focus upon action.
This suggests that taking account of motive is consistent with
the criminal law's requirement that liability wait for conduct. But
my claim is something more: that the use of motive is an importan t mechanism for keeping criminal law within the boundary of
action and out of the zone of liability for bad character. Imagine a
1.vorld where motive for conduct could not be considere d by the
criminal law, where onlv the ac tion itself could be used as
grounds for liability. (Assume the ac tor's state of mind as to that
I
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present action could be taken into account, whether his action
was intentional or accidental.) This would, I predict, be seen as a
sterile creation that was blind to much of what ought to be relevant to liability and punishment. And, with diminishing credibility in making accurate blameworthiness judgments, such a system
would be discarded in favor of something that did take account of
more relevant facts. If motive were not allowed, then the danger
arises that bad character itself would be used.
We see this tendency today, as the criminal law substitutes
predictions of future dangerousness (a claim about the d efendant's character) in place of facts that assess the actor's degree of
blameworthiness for past conduct. Dangerousness is the rationale and the criterion for special extended terms of incarceration
for habitual offenders. 6 Under such provisions, an offender may
be sentenced to life imprisonment for obtaining $120.7 5 by false
pretenses-for example, upon a showing that he committed two
previous felonies related to credit card and check fraud. 7 Some
jurisdictions use dangerousnes s as the primary criterion for deciding whether consecutive sentences should be imposed for multiple offenses. A consecutive sentence should be imposed "after a
finding by the trial judge that confinement for such a term is necessary in order to protect the public from further criminal conduct by the defendant. " 8 Dangerousness similarly is the rationale
and the criterion for extended terms for several classes of offenders, such as thos e determined to b e "sexually dangerou s persons. " 9 Under o ne of these statutes, for exampl e, a sex offender
6. See, e .g., Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann§ 13-604(K) (1992); Ark. Code An n. § 5-4501 (Michie 1987); Del. Co de Ann. tit. 11, § 4214 (1987); Fla. Stat. ch. 77 5. 084
(1991); Miss . Code Ann. § 99-1 9-83 (1991); Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 207.010
(Michie 1991) ; N.M . Stat. Ann. § 31- 18 -1 7 (Mich ie 1990) ; S.D. Co difi ed La ws
Ann.§§ 22-7-7, 22-7-8 , 22-7-8.1 (1988); \tV. Va. Co de § 61-ll-18 (1992); Wyo.
Stat. § 6-1-110. See also Am. Jur. 2d, Habitual Criminals and Subsequ ent Offenders ( 1968).
7. Such sentencing was uph eld as constitutional in Rummel v. Este ll e, 445
U .S. 263 (1980).
8. Gray v. State, 538 S.W .2d 391, 393 (Te nn. 1976) (citin g Sent encing Alternatives and Procedures, § 3.4(b)(IV), Am erican Bar Assoc iation Proj ect on
Sta ndard s for Criminal Jus tice (1968)).
9. See, e.g., Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 38, § 105-1. 0 1 et seq. (see Peo pl e v. Loven,
600 N.E.2d 893 (Ill. App. C t. 1992) (u nde rl yin g co nvicti on need not be for <1
sexual offense)) ; Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-403.1 (Sup p. 1988); Wis. Stat.§ 975. 12
(1989-1 990); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 16-13-203 (1 992). Som e jurisdictions ach ieve
the same result through judicial decision. See, e .g., State v. Barn es, 818 P.2d
l 088 ( 1991) (dangerous ness as an agg ravat ing fac tor in the sentencin g of sex
offender s).
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is committed to an indeterminate term, from one day to life imprisonment, upon a finding that he "constitutes a threat of bodily
harm to members of the public." 10 The release decision for such
offenders similarly is keyed to the dangerousness of the offender.11 Indeed, some jurisdictions allow extended terms for
nearly any serious felony where the offender is found to be dangerous.12 And many jurisdictions have their parole commissions
make release decisions for all offenses by assessing inter alia the
dangerousness of the offender. Typically, an offender may be released only if such action "will not increase the likelihood of harm
to the public." 13
The virtue of taking account of motive is that it helps focus
the inquiry on the actor's past conduct. It allows the law to consider character-related issues as they concern the actor's blameworthiness for his or her action-\Vas this act committed out of
greed? Does this conduct reflect an indifference to the valu e of
human life ?-without allowing the law to slide into an explicit inquiry into the actor's character, apart from what is reflected in his
or her act (such as his potential for future crimes). 14 Note that
the instances of dangerousness affecting punishment listed above
10. Colo. Rev . Stat.§ 16-1 3-211(2) (1992 ).
11 . The Board is authorized to release a person, "if the board deems it in
the best interes ts of that pe rson and the public and that the person , if at la rge,
would not constitute a threat of bodil y harm to me mbers of th e public." Colo.
Rev. Stat. § 16-13-216(5) (1992) .
12. See, e.g., Or. Rev. Stat.§§ 16 1.72 5, 161.7 35 (1991).
13. Tex. Crim. Proc. Code Ann ., art. 42 .18, § 8(a) (Wes t 1993). See also
Alaska Stat.§ 33 .16 . 100 (1986) ; Ark . Code Ann. § 16-93-701 (Michie 1987) (relea se when there is a reasonabl e probability that the prisoner can be r eleased
without detriment to the community) ; Colo. Rev. Stat. § 17-22 .5-404 (1992)
(the board shall fir st consider the risk of violence to the public in every re lease
d ecision it makes); Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 434 7 (1987) (a parole shall b e ord e red onl y in the bes t interest of society); Fla . Stat. Ann .§ 947.18 (West 1985)
(no person shall be placed on p arole until and unl es s the commission finds that
there is a re aso nabl e probabili ty that , if he is placed o n parole, his release will be
co mpatible with his own welfare and th e welfare of socie ty); Ky. Rev . Stat. Ann.
§ 439.340 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1985) (a pa roie shall be ordered o nly fo r th e
b es t interest of socie ty); Mo. Ann. Stat. § 2 17-690 (Verno n 1983) (whe n, in th e
b oard's opinion, there is a reaso nabi e pro ba bili ty that an offender ca n be releas ed without detriment to th e communit y, the board may in its discretion release o r paro le such person); Mon t. Co de An n. § 46-23 -20 l ( 1) ( 1992)
(" reas onable probability that th e pris oner can be re leased witho ut de trim ent to
. .. th e communit y").
14. It is not my view that dangero us perso ns ought to be fr ee fr om in capa citation. On the contrary, any viable socie ty must protect its elf from da ngero us
persons in some vvay . My view is, rather, th at dangero usness of fur.ure criminality ou gh t to be dealt with through cwil rath er th an crim inal co mmi tme n t. See
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typically exist in the less public aspects of the criminal justice system, sentencing and parole. Few, if any, offenses are defined to
make future dangerousness an element.
III
PROBLEMS IN IMPLEMENTING HATEMOTIVATION OFFENSES AND THE
ALTERNAT IVE APPROACH O F
CRIMES OF GROUP TERROR
While use of motive jibes with traditional criminal law theory,
it does not follow that hate-motive is the best means of defining
crimes of this sort. Some writers have pointed out the potential
dangers of infringing protected speech in violation of the First
Amendment. 15 Even if one concludes that some hate-motivation
formulations might not violate the First Amendment, it is hard to
feel good about coming so close to the line .
O ther scholars have suggested serious problem s in the drafting and application of hate-motivation offenses. 16 How can we
tell when an offense was in fact motivated by hatred? Even if we
can show hate motivation , how can we tell whether the hatred is
for the group or for thi s person in particular, o r some combination of the two? (Presumably, the hatred must b e for a characteristic of the victim that the victim shares with a group.) If some
combina tion of ha tred for the group and the individual is requisite, what proportion of the hate motivation must be hate for the
grou p rather than the individual? Which charac teristics-that is,
which groups-are to be covered by the offen se ? How are th ese
groups to be defined? (What is a "religion" for the purposes of
Pa ul H. Ro binson , The Criminal-Civil Distinction and Da nge rou s Blam eless O ffe nd e rs, 83 J. Crim. L. & C rimin o logy 693 ( 199 3) .
15. See, e. g., Susan Gellman , S ti cks and Ston es Can Put Yo u in Jail, But
Can Wo rd s In crease Your Sente nce? Con s tituti o nal and Po licy Dilemmas o f Ethnic Intimida ti o n Laws , 39 U.C .L. A. L. Rev. 333 (199 1); Susan Gellman , Br o th e r ,
You Can't G o to Jail for Wha t 'x'o u' re Thinking: Mo ti ves, Effe cts, an d " H ate
C rim e" La ws, 11 Crim. Jus. Ethi cs 24 (S ummer/Fall 1992 ); l'vlartin Redish , Freed o m of T hou ght as Freedom of Expres sion: Hate C rim e Sen te ncing Enh ancem e n t and First Amendme nt T heory, 11 Cri m . Ju s. Ethi cs 29 (Sum m er/Fall
1992) . But Wisconsin v. Mitch ell , 11 3 S. Ct. 21 94 (1993) , uph olds a comm o n
fo rmul a tio n o f hate crim es , fin d in g th at such statutes merely regula te n o n- exp ress ive speech . Unl es s sta te su preme co urts r ely upon the ir own constituti ons,
lh e po tential fo r furth e r co nsti tu tio nal challen ge is limited.
16. See, e .g., Gellma n , su pra note 15 (bo th a rti cl es); J a mes B . Jaco bs , Rethin king the War Aga inst Ha te Crim es: A Ne w York City Pe rspec ti ve , 11 Crim.
Ju s. Ethi cs 55 (Summer/ Fall 1992) .
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an offense motivated by hate of the victim's religion? Are some
sexual offenses necessarily hate crimes against women?) Would it
be less objectionable to commit a crime against a member of one
group than against the member of another group, if both crimes
were motivated by a hatred for the respective groups? On what
grounds could we punish hate motivation against some groups
but not others? Is there liability if the offense is motivated by a
hatred for conservatives? Oil executives? Abortionists? Americans? The subjectivity of the judgment, the difficulty of proof,
and the complexity in identifying the victim groups to be recognized, make laws regarding hate-motivation offenses difficult to
draft and apply.
A different approach to criminalizing much of the conduct
now sought to be covered by hate-motivation crimes is to focus
upon the greater harm caused and intended by such conduct,
than would occur in an analogous offense without the hate-motivation. Spray-painting a swastika on a synagogue simply is not
the same as spray-painting a gang's name on vacant buildings on
its turf. Both are forms of visual pollution and property damage
that may offend us, but the former also can hurt and intimidate, in
a very real way, all of the members of that synagogue and, less
directly, all Jews who see or hear about it. A greater harm to a
greater number of people can result, and frequently is intended,
where the conduct seeks to intimidate or emotionally injure an
identifiable group, than in instances where the same conduct does
not target a particular group.
The cross-burning on an African-American family's front
yard is more harmful and therefore deserves greater punishment
than a similar size fire in a different context without the hate
message. All crime, especially public crime, can hurt and intimidate each of us; however, the other African-American families in
the neighborhood and, to a lesser extent, other blacks who hear
of the incident can be hurt and intimidated by the burning more
than they or we are hurt or intimidated by a non-hate-message
burning. This, of course, is frequently exactly what the offender
h o pes and desires. He or she seeks to send a mes sage of hate and
an im plicit threat to both the immediate victims and to others of
the same group. By focusing on the additional harms as the basis
for greater liability, we avoid the hate-motivation application
problems as well as the potential First Amendm ent iss ues .
T aking account of such secondary harms in crim ina lizi n g and
grading conduct is no t new. Provisions like Mod el Penal Co de
section 250.9, for example, criminalize the desecra ti o n of vener-

CRIIV1ES 0 F MOTIVE

615

ated objects precisely because of the potential for greater harm
that such conduct brings. (Consistent with this, the Code classes
the offense as one against public order and decency rather than as
an offense against property.)
The challenge is to draft a statute that will encompass the
variety of things that people can do to intimidate and emotionally
injure a group by victimizing one person on the present occasion.
Perhaps something along the fo llowing lines would be a starting
point:
Causing or Risking Group Intimidation or Terror. Any person who
commits an offense and, by such conduct, purposely or recklessly causes or hopes to cause intimidation or terror in a
group of persons who identify with the victim [through race,
religion, gender, or sexual preference], shall be liable for an
offense under this section. If the person purposely causes or
hopes to cause such intimidation or terror, the offense is a
[fourth degree felony]. If the person recklessly causes such
intimidation or terror, the offense is a [second degree
misdemeanor]. I 7
Note that liability could be available under this section even if the
group were not in fact intimidated or terrorized . Because the
provision is drafted as a separate offense, an actor can be held
liable for an unsuccessful attempt to commit the offense. 18
T here remains the question of how broadly to define the
groups wh ose intimidation may trigger the offense. Given the
soundness of the underlying theory-greater harm deserves
greater liability-one could have the offense apply to any crime
that intimidates any larger group, as the draft statute does. In
practice, the offense would still be u sed primarily against those
who seek to intimidate or terrorize the groups that historically
h ave been victimized in this way. In this form, however, the offense also could be used to give added punishment fo r efforts to
intimid ate or terrorize any group. For example, it could be used
against persons who assault attendees at a pro-choice (or pro-life)
convention in an effort to intimidate or terrorize others at th e
conven tion . On the o ther hand, if the point of the legislation is to
17. O ffense grades are included not to propose the particular grades; different statutory grades have different meanings in different jurisdictions. The
point, rather, is to show that purpose and recklessness as to causing intimidation
or terror in the group might be graded differentlv.
18. T here may be disagreement over whether the reckless form of the offense can be punished un d er an attempt statute. See Paul H. Robinson, A Functional Analysis of Criminal Law, 88 Nw. U. L. Rev.- (forthcoming 1994).
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make a speciai, symbolic statement in favor of tolerance for diversity along particular lines-race, religion, sexual preference, to
name a few-then more limited application may be preferred.
Nevertheless, this may still raise the choice-of-group problems inherent in the application of hate-motivation statutes noted above.

